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ASSET DIVIDEND YIELD SKEW 
IMPLIED IN CORPORATE CREDIT SPREADS 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Given that asset volatility skew expresses several levels of business 
risk according to the leverage used, the goal of this paper is to prove 
the relevance of dividend policy (skew effect) in the credit spreads 
of a company. In a simple analysis framework, this work highlights 
significant implications for the analysis of some recent market 
phenomena: Dividend Aristocrats (DA), the Low Volatility 
Anomaly (LVA) and the Credit Spread Puzzle (CSP). Whilst the 
DA classifies high dividend yield (and also, oddly, high asset 
volatility) companies in the S&P500, the LVA highlight the fact 
that low-risk firms generate a better performance with respect to 
high-risk firms, contrary to the CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing 
Model). The CSP refers to the structural model’s inability (and not 
only) to explain empirical credit spreads fully, in particular for 
investment grade issuers. The evidence that these latter companies 
are highly profitable (‘Dividend Aristocrats’) seems to confirm the 
Pecking Order Theory. In addition, for investment grade companies 
a slight increase in leverage implies higher received benefits in 
terms of the risk-return combination, thus also supporting the 
Trade-off Theory. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The aim of this work is to show the relationship between a firm’s 
wealth distribution policies (WDP) and leverage policies (LP), in 
order to determine its credit spread and equity dividend yield (or 
firm performance). The paper attempts to answer questions 
concerning the two corporate policies mentioned, such as what (if 
any) the implicit relationship between the two is, or what 
connections these policies might have with asset volatility; we also 
theorize or argue significant implications in theoretical and empirical 
terms. Furthermore, the recent international financial crisis has led to 
an increase in the average corporate leverage ratio and so a firm may 
have to reduce the payout level in order to support an increasing 
level of interest to be paid in the future: what will the implications be 
for credit spread and equity dividend policy? We can imagine that 
the two policies are part of a single topic, i.e. the (general) issue of 
the capital structure of a company, especially if we bear in mind that 
the value of each claim is closely related to the expected earnings it 
will generate. 
Hence, this paper assumes that WDP and LP are connected, and 
attempts to outline the relationship implicit in the credit spreads on 
the market, classified by ratings (from AAA to B). From this point of 
view, firms use/balance against each other leverage and payout in 
order to render the securities of the company competitive on the 
market in terms of equity dividend yield and credit spread, over the 
risk.  Using corporate credit spreads and other data (Lehman, Duffie, 
Huang et al.) for different rating (average leverage) classes in the 
original structural framework (Merton model, 1974), the scope of the 
paper is to extrapolate the WDP and equity dividend yields implied, 
and to compare theoretical expectations and findings. 
From another point of view, by using the WDP-LP relationship 
this work attempts to explain or link two market phenomena or 
anomalies which have emerged over the years: the Credit Spread 
Puzzle (CSP) and the Low Volatility Anomaly (LVA). This latter 
topic is certainly one of the most discussed in the literature and 
assumes that financial assets with low levels of risk are more 
profitable, in contrast with what has been shown by the classical 
models of asset pricing (for example, the Capital Asset Pricing 
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Model - CAPM). Several contributions have been proposed in this 
respect; Black’s pioneering work (1972) shows that the security 
market line might reasonably look flatter rather than tending 
upwards, pointing out the best performance of shares at low risk. 
Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), and Baker, Bradley and Würgler 
(2011) show that stocks with low beta exhibit better performance 
than stocks with high beta. 
Thus, the beta estimated by the CAPM cannot fully explain the 
cross-section of unconditional stock returns (Fama and French 
(1992)) or conditional stock returns (Lewellen and Nagel (2006)). 
Not so paradoxically, the US market revealed a flat security market 
line that is best understood by the CAPM with investors suffering 
debt constraints (Black (1972, 1992), Brennan (1971), Mehrling 
(2005)); Gibbons (1982), Kandel (1984) and Shanken (1985) share 
this point of view. Even when considering idiosyncratic risk, the 
low-return with high-volatility effect remains (Falkenstein (1994), 
Ang, Hodrick, Xing, Zhang (2006, 2009), Frazzini, Pedersen 
(2012)). As for the effect relating to leverage, the trading margin 
requirements for investors may help to generate the anomaly 
(Brennan (1993), Hindy (1995), Cuoco (1997), Garleanu and 
Pedersen (2009), Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2010)). 
Furthermore, funding liquidity risk is linked to market liquidity risk 
(Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2010)), 
which also affects required returns (Acharya and Pedersen (2005)). 
Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen (2011) report evidence of a low-beta 
effect across asset classes. Furthermore, Frazzini and Perdersen 
(2012) build a model of asset pricing in line with the volatility 
anomaly, arguing that the underlying causes are to be found in the 
differences between investors in terms of debt capacity and 
investment constraints. 
Recently, other contributions to the literature have attempted to 
explore the causes of the LVA, to study its effects in terms of 
management and business performance, and to create profitable 
investment strategies. In the latter area, Clarke et al. (2011) 
decompose stocks (for systematic and idiosyncratic risk), 
highlighting improved performance for those at low risk. De Silva 
(2012) uses different ETFs to exploit the performance potential 
related to the LVA. Asness et al. (2012) suggest a link between 
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investment strategies of risk parity type and the effect of the LVA. 
Thus Asness et al. (2014) and Frazzini et al. (2014) find profitable 
strategies based on this anomaly, even after controlling for effects 
related to the industry. Fiore et al. (2015) explore the characteristics 
of the LVA in relation to phenomena of a cyclical or seasonal nature, 
finding superior performance in the summer months. Garcia-Feijó et 
al. (2015) show that strategies with lower risk are influenced by 
general economic conditions. In contrast, Li et al. (2014) and Xiong 
et al. (2014) offer evidence for diminished benefits of such 
strategies. As regards the effects of the LVA, Dutt et al. (2013) argue 
that consistent operating performance may explain this anomaly, 
while Baker et al. (2015) show that the banking regulatory system 
could affect firms’ assets and so equities. Finally, some authors have 
attempted to provide analysis related to the causes underlying the 
LVA. For example, Blitz et al. (2007) propose three underlying 
causes of the phenomenon: leverage restrictions on some investors, 
inefficient investment processes, and behavioral bias. Li et al. (2013) 
show that the anomaly may be due to factors specific to the company 
or the stock. Hsu et al. (2013) show that financial analysts’ 
predictions may confuse investors; stocks with high beta are linked 
with excessive optimism in analysts' forecasts. Blitz (2014) presents 
an agent-based model with 3 factors to explain the anomaly. De 
Carvalho et al. (2014) report evidence of LVA in major bond 
markets, while Baker et al. (2014) suggest a decomposition of causes 
from microeconomic (stock selection) and macroeconomic points of 
view (country selection). Finally, Baker et al. (2015) suggest a link 
between the capital structure of a company and the LVA: companies 
with high risk assets may reveal low leverage but also low equity 
volatility. In contrast, Fama et al. (2015) make up a model with 5 
explanatory factors, arguing that the most profitable companies 
could show a low volatility effect. 
In order to prove the existence of LVA, it is useful to note that 
since 2009, Standard & Poor have actively selected an array of 
approximately 40 companies which on the one hand represent a very 
small portion of the total capitalization of the S&P500 index, and on 
the other perform best in terms of both Dividend Yield (DY) and 
risk. Several investment strategies and financial products based on 
the above are proposed by the academic community, by practitioners 
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and by asset managers. These securities are usually named Dividend 
Aristocrats (DA), given their long-term intrinsic capacity to yield 
high dividends and, at the same time, mitigate equity volatility, 
particularly if compared to the average for other listed companies. 
According to Soe (2009), the DA group indiscriminately includes 
enterprises from a cross section, i.e. they belong to extremely diverse 
economic sectors. This seems to be in contrast with the Trade-off 
Theory: high dividends are the consequence of highly leveraged 
companies for specific economic sectors (utilities, financials and 
state firms). Another common belief is that hi-tech firms, having 
significantly volatile investments, offer returns which rely more on 
capital gains than on dividends. However, AT&T, Microsoft, Cisco, 
3M and Automatic Data Processing are concrete examples of 
corporations considered as DA which, although operating in the hi-
tech industry, in past years alternately distributed the highest DY or 
offered large buy-back plans. 
Another feature of the companies included in S&P500 is their 
outstanding credit rating (all in the “A” category). This relatively 
new phenomenon has been examined in recent literature, where it is 
for the moment justified as being a consequence of the WDP, which 
is to be interpreted as the combination of dividends and buy-back 
plans. This policy could also be expressed in terms of payout. 
Williams and Miller (2013) compared the S&P500 and S&P500DA 
indexes and showed that companies which redistribute high 
dividends in subsequent years perform better that the market when 
there is a recession. However, not every high-yield stock is able to 
replicate these payoffs. Hauser (2013), for example, studied the trend 
underlying the recent international crisis with regard to corporate 
dividend policy. Spaht et al. (2010), (2012) and (2013) used the 
stock group when defining investment strategies aiming at financial 
independence. The authors, despite writing within different streams 
of the literature, all agree that the DA is an efficient tool for 
measuring investments’ risk versus return: whatever the industry of 
reference, the index includes the best performers in terms of stability 
and creditworthiness of the company. 
Another, closely related, aim of the present work is to highlight a 
link between LVA, DA (and so the relationship between high asset 
risk and significant WDP or DY) and the Credit Spread Puzzle 
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(CSP). This latter phenomenon has emerged over the past twenty 
years, in particular thanks to the increased attention paid to the topic 
of credit risk and significant regulatory activity aiming at 
guaranteeing an adequate level of equity within the whole financial 
system. 
Research covering credit risk, in both the academic and the 
professional worlds, has led to the development of methodological 
approaches in terms of the evaluation and management of risk. The 
scientific contribution has increased significantly, from the points of 
view of both the Financial Models Area (FMA) and the Empirical 
Evidence Area (EEA). 
As far as credit risk is concerned, another stream of work is 
identified in the scope of the research itself. On the one hand we find 
pricing analysis (also called credit spread) and on the other, default 
prediction. In most cases, both objectives can be addressed jointly or 
through different evaluation models. 
The FMA entails several mathematical and statistical models 
based on different methodological models (i.e. actuarial, reduced-
form, structural models). The present work focuses on the structural 
model and is based on the seminal work by Merton (1974), in which 
the theoretical framework underpinning the evaluation of corporate 
debt and so credit spread is identified, creating a link between market 
information (risk premium and interest rate) and specific corporate 
features (balance sheets and business risk). The effectiveness of the 
Merton model was long doubted by a large part of the community, 
which pushed for progress within the theory, in particular in an 
attempt to overcome limits and ambiguities in terms of adherence to 
empirical samples. 
The empirical literature (EEA) is dedicated to credit risk analysis, 
drawing upon econometric and statistical techniques with the aim of 
either highlighting specific patterns to be explained through 
explicative factors/variables or testing the effectiveness of 
previously-developed models. Jones et al. (1982) record some 
inefficiencies found in the original model proposed by Merton 
(1974): Huang et al (2012) report the inefficiencies of the structural 
models in fully explaining the level of credit spreads; another point 
relates to the market conditions expressed in the risk premium, in 
that considering the latter as a fixed variable is not appropriate (time-
!10 
varying equity market premium). In addition, Huang et al. (2012) 
state that there are other risks/factors having an impact on spreads 
(liquidity and transaction costs, to cite but two), but it is also 
probable that the ineffectiveness of the different models is due to 
their inability (in other ways) to capture the essence of the 
relationship between creditor and debtor. This gap or inability is 
known as the Credit Spread Puzzle (CSP), and is also persistent in 
more advanced models. 
Chen et al. (2009) highlight how the CSP phenomenon is related 
to the equity premium puzzle, pointing out how these two asset class 
markets react in different ways to the same source of uncertainty. 
Chen (2010) proposes a model based on a dynamic financial 
structure that is able to weigh different market conditions more 
effectively, generating spreads in line with the puzzle. A similar 
solution (in terms of model output), which links within the same 
framework the equity premium of a leveraged company with its 
credit spreads, is proposed by Bhamra et al. (2009). In conclusion, as 
summarized by Goldenstein et al. (2011), the puzzle is dependent 
upon several risks which are not weighted, and not only on default. 
However, the main reason the models are unable to explain the 
spreads derives from an imprecise weighting of the underlying 
drivers (business risk, corporate dividend policy, leverage, default 
costs, equity market premium).  
This paper shows the relevance of the WDP in explaining spreads 
(and LVA). A dividend policy leads to a reduction in the asset value, 
which is the main guarantee for investors. This result is robust even 
when considering very limited leverage (or a high rating, i.e. AAA); 
hence credit spreads might be high because they reflect the higher 
risk of wealth transfer from shareholders to the detriment of 
creditors. 
The existence of a firm wealth distribution effect (or Asset 
Dividend Skew) on credit spreads is important in both empirical and 
theoretical terms. With reference to the former, the structural models 
should entail this effect, and to the latter, the calibration should a 
priori estimate specific average behaviors according to different 
leverage levels and the enterprise risk. 
The results of the analysis show that under different degrees of 
leverage implied in the credit spreads, the average behavior of 
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corporations concerning dividend policy varies with a skewed effect, 
suggesting support for the Trade-off Theory and the Pecking Order 
Theory. Furthermore, the results are consistent with the LVA: firms 
with low leverage (high asset volatility and high asset dividend 
yield) could exhibit low levels of equity volatility as expressed by 
Fama et al. (2015). 
This work complements the literature linking the CSP and LVA 
as different sides of the same coin. The two phenomena are linked by 
the WDP; profitable firms with low leverage exhibit low equity 
volatility (compared to CAPM) and high credit spreads (compared to 
current credit risk models). To prove this link, first of all the 
relevance of WDP in explaining the CSP is revealed; then analysis of 
the results highlights consistency with LVA. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the Asset 
Dividend Policy Skew hypothesis. Section 3 explains the empirical 
test, detailing the research, the sample, the methodology and the 
results. Finally, Section 4 summarizes final considerations 
concerning LVA. 
 
2. The Relevance of Wealth Dividend Policy in Credit Spreads 
and Explanation of Low Volatility  
 
This work assumes that the asset dividend policy (or firm WDP) 
is evidenced through the distribution of a cash dividend and/or buy-
back plan. Huang et al. (2012) point out that in most cases structural 
(and other) models produce theoretical spreads that can cover a 
minimal fraction of their empirical counterparts. The authors present 
an array of structural models drawn from the existing literature in 
order to highlight their explicative power. These models are 
subjected to a unique calibration process that guarantees a set of 
initial hypotheses for the parameters. In this specific calibration 
setting, the authors choose a constant level of firm wealth 
distribution (Asset Dividend Yield ! = 6%) for each model and for 
each rating category.  
This latter assumption seems restrictive: in particular, it is worth 
noting that different companies have different WDP policies similar 
to dividend stripping (note that the number of share buy-backs has 
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increased considerably over the past decade, due to fiscal benefits). 
In addition, the dividend policy is subject to the leverage ratio of the 
company and its creditworthiness (rating). Therefore, it is plausible 
to hypothesize a relationship between companies’ payouts and their 
leverage ratios. 
The inability of the structural models to explain perfectly real 
credit spreads can be related to an erroneous weighting of the effects 
of the firm’s WDP. For this reason, the assumption of a constant 
asset dividend yield per each rating class might lead to an 
underestimation of the consequent negative effects for bondholders, 
also taking into account the analogy between the Credit Spread 
Puzzle (CSP) and the LVA. It is possible that the asset dividend 
yield varies according to the rating classes (or leverage, as each 
rating class can be associated to an average level of indebtedness), 
and therefore behaves according to specific patterns. 
The implied volatility smile or skew phenomenon occurs when 
describing the volatility of the derivative’s underlying value 
according to the market price and the leverage of the contract. As 
regards corporations, the implied volatility skew represents the 
business risk associated with the different levels of capital debt 
deployed. This paper hypothesizes that the asset dividend policy 
assumes a skew effect in function of the rating (or leverage) and is 
interdependent on the implied volatility effect. This assumption, if 
confirmed, will lead to significant impacts both in terms of modeling 
and in empirical terms. In the first case, efficient models should 
include a dynamic variable for the asset dividend policy; in the 
second, in the light of management of the derivatives’ underlying 
security, the models should be calibrated differently, without the 
estimation of a constant parameter per different rating class or 
leverage. 
In their empirical study, Hillegeist et al. (2004) note that the 
impact of dividends is extremely important when it comes to 
estimations of the real probability of default of a company. However, 
they do not provide for a test to highlight this effect (i.e. the dividend 
yield skew). Therefore, in order to prove the existence of the asset 
dividend skew, Section 3 shows an empirical test built on the initial 
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hypotheses of Merton (1974), upon which the implied volatility 
smile or skew was calculated. The choice of model derives from a 
twofold consideration: on one hand, the desire to maintain a simple 
framework of analysis; on the other, the volatility skew effect is 
notoriously persistent in more advanced models, as underlined by 
Huang et al. (2012). 
The test aims at comparing the explicative power of several 
hypotheses concerning asset dividend level in terms of difference 
between theoretical and empirical spreads, considering three constant 
policies (asset dividend yield equal to 0%, 6% and 12%) and a 
variable policy per each rating class. Each estimate derives from a 
specific matching process between corporate features and a set target 
expressed according to: rating class, leverage, equity premium, 
probability of default and credit spread. 
There are two hypotheses underpinning the test: 
Hypothesis 1 – The Asset Dividend Policy (or WDP) is relevant for 
the definition of the Credit Spread level.  
Hypothesis 2 – The Asset Dividend Policy (or WDP) has a greater 
impact on the spreads of investment grade bonds, highlighting low 
stock volatility. 
 
Within Hypothesis 1, the term “relevant” indicates the concept of 
variable asset dividend policy according to the different levels of CS 
(rating or leverage). The WDP is identified through the variable asset 
dividend yield (!!), expected to be higher or lower than the Huang et 
al. (2012) hypothesis (6%). If it is higher, it is possible to conclude 
that the authors may have undervalued WDP effects on spreads (thus 
highlighting the concept of a puzzle). On the contrary, whenever !! 
is lower than 6% there is an undervaluation effect on the CS and this 
result emerges for the no investment grade class. 
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3. Empirical Tests 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The main scope of these tests is to measure the empirical 
relevance of asset dividend policy (or WDP) in defining the level of 
credit spreads for different rating categories. If relevance is 
confirmed, the results should clearly indicate that companies most 
vulnerable to the CSP (i.e. investment grade, according to the 
literature) are also the most efficient in terms of asset dividend 
policy and LVA. Both anomalies (on the one hand the CSP and on 
the other higher risk assets associated with high dividends) should 
appear instead plausible in the proposed framework of analysis. 
In this regard, unlike Huang et al. (2012), this section proposes a 
matching test between the spreads of theoretical and empirical 
models (in addition to other target variables) in order to estimate the 
underlying unobservable parameters. The hypothesis of a variable 
asset dividend yield for different rating classes tends to be in 
opposition to what was proposed by Huang et al. (2012), who 
constantly set it at 6%; we thus aim to highlight the relevance of its 
estimate within calibration models. We thus aim to generate outputs 
which are equal to a predefined set of targets, specifically in terms of 
the severity of the debt (maturity, actual probability of default, credit 
spreads), financial leverage and equity premium. These targets have 
largely been borrowed from the contribution made by Huang et al. 
(2012). However, some of the assumptions and calibration targets 
are abandoned with the purpose of extrapolating the effects of the 
asset dividend policy (WDP). For this reason, the test can be broken 
down into two major parts: the first is dedicated to outlining the 
effects of the Asset Dividend Yield Skew; the second part, on the 
contrary, aims to analyse the underlying fundamental variables 
(including business risk, leverage and asset dividend yield). 
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3.2 Data 
 
In order to estimate perceptions concerning the CSP in bond 
markets, a sample of information relative to the severity of debt and 
the equity market premium was collected). To achieve the 
aforementioned goal, the data sample covers two different time 
horizons, short term (i.e. 4 years) and longer term (10 years). The 
data set relies largely on information regarding the severity of the 
corporate bonds expressed in terms of the classic rating categories 
(AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B). 
Table 1 – Information on data sources, estimation methods and sample periods for the 
variables that make up the database. Leverage ratios are from Standard & Poor’s (1999). 
Equity premium estimates are based on regression results found in Bhandari (1988). Historical 
default rates and average recovery rates are from the Moody’s report by Keenan, Shtogrin, and 
Sobenhart (1999). Average yield spreads for ten-year investment-grade bonds are based on 
monthly Lehman bond index data over January 1973–December 1993. Average spreads for 
four-year investment-grade bonds are based on those reported in Duffee (1998) for a sample of 
noncallable bonds from January 1985–March 1995. Average yield spreads for junk (or non-
investment grade) bonds are based on Caouette, Altman, and Narayanan (1998).  
Variable Source Period Note 
Equity Premium Bhandari (1988) Huang and Huang (2012) 1990s 
Equity Premium 
Regression Model 
calibrated (SP500 
EP & Lev = 6% & 
35%) 
Leverage Standard & Poor’s (1999) 1990s Rating Criteria 
Default 
Probability 
Moody’s – Keenan, Shtogrin, 
Sobehart (1999) 1978-1998 
Senior Unsecured 
Bond 
Credit Spreads 
Lehman bond index data 10y IG – 1973-1993 
Callable, 
Noncallable + 10 bp 
Duffee (1998) 4y IG – 1985-1995 
Noncallable 
Caouette, Altman, Narayanan 
(1998) NIG 
Noncallable 
 
The associated features are: the probability of default and the CS 
(to maturity), expressed as average values per rating class. This 
information is derived from Huang et al. (2012), as are the average 
values associated with each rating class, i.e. the leverage and the 
equity risk premium. 
!16 
 
Table 2 – Statistics relative to the target variables per each rating class, as defined in Huang et 
al. (2012). Variables: ("!#) leverage (Standard & Poor’s – 1999), (!!) equity risk premium 
(Bhandari – 1988),  ("!) probability of default (Moody’s – Keenan, Sthogrin, Sobenhart – 
1999), (!") credit spreads (Lehman – Duffee, 1998, Caouette-Altman-Narayanan, 1998). Other 
underlying hypotheses for the empirical test: a market volatility !!!) equal to 20% and 
estimated through the S&P 500 index in the period 1993-2000; risk free rate !!!) equal to 8%, 
as in Huang et al. (2012). 
Statistics for Targets vs Rating Class 
 "!" !!  "! !"  
10 years Maturity  
AAA 0.1308 0.0538 0.0077 0.0063  
AA 0.2118 0.0560 0.0099 0.0091  
A 0.3198 0.0599 0.0155 0.0123  
BBB 0.4328 0.0655 0.0439 0.0194  
BB 0.5353 0.073 0.2063 0.032  
B 0.657 0.0876 0.4391 0.047  
4 years Maturity  
AAA 0.1308 0.0538 0.0004 0.0055  
AA 0.2118 0.0560 0.0023 0.0065  
A 0.3198 0.0599 0.0035 0.0096  
BBB 0.4328 0.0655 0.0124 0.0158  
BB 0.5353 0.073 0.0851 0.032  
B 0.657 0.0876 0.2332 0.047  
      
 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize respectively the data source and the 
relative information; the data sample is composed of average values 
for each type of information and for each class of rating. Each 
variable represents an excess return (CS or equity premium) or a 
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specific characteristic of the firm and so all measures of risk have to 
be estimated to verify the CSP and LVA. 
Data on default probabilities provided by the rating agencies are 
grouped by rating categories. As a result, the analysis focuses on all 
companies with the same credit rating at a given point in time, rather 
than on any individual company. A general underlying assumption is 
that these data offer a representation of average behavior (for each 
rating class) of a firm that has a senior unsecured bond outstanding, 
and the bond issued by our generic firm has the same probability of 
default as the historical default rate for bonds of the same seniority 
and credit rating. 
 
Figure 1 –Mean trend of credit spreads (10-year maturity) per each rating class, to which are 
associated the relative averages in terms of probability of default (PD) in basis points and the 
financial leverage (Lev). Data source: Huang et al. (2012). 
 
 
The data given in Table 2 is represented, for the longer run, in 
Figure 1, where, given the 10 years maturity information, it is 
possible to see the average CS trend. On the horizontal axis each 
AAA AA A BBB BB B
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rating class is associated with the average level of probability of 
default and leverage. This final element permits a further 
consideration: the trend of the variables can be estimated as a 
function of leverage, enabling comparison between the policies of 
both capital structure and wealth distribution (WDP). Credit spreads 
were collected from Lehman Brothers bond indexes, the average 
leverage is as estimated by Standard & Poors, the probability of 
default is given by Moody's and the equity premium by Bhandari 
(1988). All information is relative to the US market. 
In order to express better the explicative power of the test, five 
parameters were chosen so as to summarize on the one hand the 
conditions of the market (external) and, on the other, of the company 
(internal). With regard to the former, the following points were 
considered: " the level of the risk free interest rate, assumed constant and 
equal to 8% annually, is consistent with the initial hypothesis 
in Huang et al. (2012); furthermore, the estimate is close to 
the historical average of US Treasury rates for the period 
1973-1998;  " the level of market volatility (20%) is approximated by 
estimating the annualized standard deviation of daily returns 
of the S&P 500 (source: Thomson-Reuters Datastream), in 
the period from 1990 to 1999; " the underlying asset dividend yield of the market portfolio is 
assumed to be 6%, in line with Huang et al. (2012).  
The market risk premium is not considered as a model input 
(thus, not estimated by the S&P 500), and for the purposes of this 
analysis it is set as an unknown variable. The expectation is that this 
information will depend on the rating classes, indicating a specific 
and implicit perception, aversion or risk appetite on the part of 
investors, being also partly in line with a time-varying equity market 
premium. 
With regard to the latter, the last variable to be determined is 
asset value. In the spread calculation, assuming as the underlying 
hypothesis that leverage is constant for different deadlines per each 
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rating class, it is possible to normalize the value of the assets (in the 
test 100) and therefore not to have to estimate the parameter. 
Nevertheless, this choice excludes the possibility of taking into 
account some size effects. The decision to maintain the level of 
leverage and the risk premium for equity constant for different 
maturities may not be realistic, but it provides a handle in terms of 
comparison with the work of Huang et al. (2012). 
 
3.3 Methodology regarding Estimation of the Fundamentals and 
Market Variables 
 
As mentioned above, the goal of the tests in the Merton model is 
to highlight the effect of different WDPs for several rating classes 
(or levels of leverage) in explaining the real CS. The metric chosen 
to measure the explanatory power of spreads is the ratio between the 
estimated variable with the model and empirical data.1 Appendix 1 
shows a shortened version of the Merton model (1974). The main 
relationships or equations that define the positions of claimholders 
(shareholders and creditors) adopted in the analysis are recalled 
below. Merton (1974) uses inputs and produces outputs which are 
not observable in reality. Generally, if the equity and/or debt is/are 
listed in some financial market is possible to estimate the value of 
the fundamentals (the value of the asset, its performance, its 
volatility and its dividend yield).2 To obtain these estimates, it is 
necessary to create a system of n nonlinear equations in n unknowns, 
representing the output to analyse. The tests can entail different 
numbers of variables, by changing the number of necessary relations 
(information) to estimate them. 
The first part of the test is divided into four sections (or different 
assumptions concerning the WDP): whilst in the first three (asset 
dividend yield equal to 0%, 6% and 12%), the assumptions provide a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The models might generate an overvaluation or an undervaluation versus the real 
data. The Credit Spread Puzzle represents an undervaluation. 
2 In the present contribution, the test is not performed on share price information. 
3 The definition of three different guesses reflects the necessity to maximize the 
2 In the present contribution, the test is not performed on share price information. 
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constant asset dividend policy for different rating classes, in the last 
one the parameter is considered as variable. The distinction between 
constant and variable requires a different process for the estimation 
of the underlying fundamentals. Specifically, in the first three tests of 
the Merton model with constant DP, the goal of the estimation 
process is convergence to three targets (leverage, equity premium 
and the probability of default), defined by three 
relationships/equations, according to the unknowns to be defined 
(volatility of return on assets, equity market premium or market 
performance, leverage or default boundary for the asset value). 
Subsequently, the theoretical credit spreads, based on model 
estimates, are related to empirical data in an attempt to measure the 
different explanatory powers generated from different constant 
WDPs. In these tests, the system of nonlinear equations adopted (1) 
is composed of three relations in as many unknowns: 
 !!!! ! !"#!"$%#&!! ! !! ! !"!"$%#&! ! !" !!! ! !! ! !! ! !!!! !!! ! ! "!!"$%#&
!!!!!! 
 
In the last test, the asset dividend yield is now an unknown factor 
that is supposed to vary for different rating classes, so the number of 
equations needed is greater than before. In this case, the aim of the 
estimation process is convergence to the targets previously defined 
in Merton’s model (leverage, equity market premium, level of 
liabilities) plus an additional one, related to empirical credit spread. 
More specifically, the expectation is that the estimation process 
generates a convergence even in terms of spread. 
Analysis will thus mainly concern the underlying fundamentals 
(including dividend yield) implied in the real credit spreads. The 
! 21 
system of nonlinear equations (2) is composed of four target-
matching equations: 
 !!!! ! !"#!"$%#&!! ! !! ! !"!"$%#&! ! !" !!! ! !! ! !! ! !!!! !!! ! ! "!!"$%#&
! !" !!!! ! !! ! !"!"$%#&
!!!!!!! 
 
System (2) has four underlying unobservable parameters 
associated with the different rating categories: asset volatility, the 
nominal level of corporate liabilities, market risk premium (or 
market returns) and of course asset dividend yield. The return on 
assets (kA) can be derived from the asset volatilities. Any other 
information regarding the company (dividend, equity dividend yield, 
pay-out, equity delta, equity beta and volatility, return required by 
shareholders) is calculated according to the estimates of the 
unknown variables identified. 
The systems' goal is to adapt the variables in terms of, 
respectively, leverage, the equity risk premium, severity of the debt 
(probability of bankruptcy, credit spreads) to the targets defined. The 
Merton (1974) equations of debt and equity returns are shown in 
Appendix. 
In order to solve these systems, we propose an optimization 
strategy or minimization. Using computational software (Matlab), 
the calculation process (for minimization of system functions) uses a 
(Large-Scale) iterative strategy: an algorithm based on a subspace 
trust region method (or Interior-Reflective Newton Method), built in 
to specific programming functions (e.g. fsolve). The effectiveness 
and efficiency of the results of the iterative strategies are often 
conditioned by the (guessed) starting point. The duration and 
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outcome of the processes of convergence to the unique solutions for 
all the equations in the system are also dependent on the starting 
points; the asset volatility starting point is set at 20% yearly, equal to 
the market volatility estimation; for the debt value this is the face 
value implied in the leverage target; for the asset dividend yield the 
level of interest risk free rate is (8%), while the market risk premium 
is the average of the equity risk premium associated with the rating 
category. 3  The resolution process of the system so defined is 
efficient and able to achieve convergence to unique solutions within 
a maximum of 4 or 5 iterations (minimization). 
 
4. Test Results 
 
4.1. Guidelines for Interpretation of Results  
 
The results are presented in Tables 3-7 and differ according to the 
proposed research methodology. Table 3 shows the test results on the 
proposed hypotheses. Table 4 captures the respective estimates of the 
unknown variables and the model’s parameters (fundamentals and 
derivatives relative to the assets of the company). Table 5 shows 
estimates relative to claims (and their behavior in terms of risk and 
return), while last two propose some performance indexes per rating 
class. 
The estimates of the parameters are analyzed in order to examine 
the specific patterns of the variables according to maturity and 
creditworthiness. Three different investigations of the estimate 
results were conducted. More specifically, attention was given to the 
analysis of: WDP relevance; business risk, corporate dividend policy 
and risk premium (embedded in the spreads of the factors); variables 
related to corporate claims dynamics (equity and bond) in terms of 
values, expected returns and risk. An important distinction between 
estimated parameters is conducted according to their main typology: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The definition of three different guesses reflects the necessity to maximize the 
iterative efficiency within the convergence process towards a sole solution for the 
three/four equations defined in the systems. The specific levels are defined through 
calibration.  
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unknown underlying variables and those derived from the former. 
The estimates which emerged from the iterative processes express 
statistical averages per rating class, as per the inputs of the sample 
under analysis. This implies that some overlaps between rating 
classes are not considered: companies with AAA-rated bonds may 
reveal similar spreads but different fundamentals (leverage, risk and 
asset dividend policy). 
 
4.2. Results and Fundamental Estimates Implied by the Credit 
Spreads 
 
The majority of the test results highlight a convergence to 
predefined targets, allowing the conclusion that they are reliable (or 
efficient). Table 3 expresses the fractioned results within the 
aforementioned firm WDP, assuming, for the first three tests, a 
constant asset dividend yield (0%, 6% and 12%), aimed at matching 
the three variables (leverage, equity premium, probability of default). 
In this way, the explicative power of the model is assessed by 
comparing the spreads generated by the model and the empirical 
data; the more the ratio tends to 1, the greater the explicative power 
of the model, expressed with the calibration set assumed. 
Figure 2 depicts the skew effect of the asset dividend policy in 
function of its rating class and leverage (bearing in mind that each 
rating class can be associated to an average level of leverage). The 
skew decreases, following a trend which is sufficiently clear to 
conclude that the volatility of the company’s performance has a 
strong influence. This has a significant impact in terms of calibration 
and modeling. 
The fact that asset volatility assumes a downward trend (skew 
effect) according to its rating or leverage may appear 
counterintuitive. In contrast with the common belief that reputable 
companies (AAA or at least investment grade) should represent a 
moderate business risk, real data reveal the exact opposite: Dividend 
Aristocrats such as Cisco, Apple and others are concrete examples of 
investment grade companies with high levels of asset volatility. 
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Table 3 – Empirical test results relative to the relevance of wealth distribution in explaining 
firms’ behavior in terms of leverage, equity premium, probability of default and credit spreads. 
Each test is performed according to Merton (1974). The results are expressed as the ratio 
between estimated (CSE) and empirical spreads or targets (CST). If the estimation is close to the 
target, the ratio tends to 1, which represents maximum convergence (efficiency). The test is 
split into four sections with three constant asset dividend yields per each rating class, i.e.: zero 
dividend policy (ZDP), HH - 6%, the Huang et al. (2012) hypothesis; 2HH - 12%, double the 
level of the previous yield; and finally a variable asset dividend yield. In this last case, the 
process of convergence assumes that the parameter is unknown for each rating class and so has 
to be estimated. If the ratio is less than 1, this indicates an undervaluation of the credit spreads, 
and if it is more than 1, an overvaluation. 
 
Convergence Ratio between Estimate and Target WDPs 
(constant and variable) 
 Merton (1974) - !!- WDP 
 "!# ! !!" !! ! !!" !!! ! !!"# '!"#!$#%& 
 !"!!"!  !"!!"!  !"!!"!  !"!!"!  
T = 10 years 
AAA 0.1217 0.53412 1.845 1 
AA 0.10937 0.54162 2.2123 1 
A 0.12206 0.65798 6.5586 1 
BBB 0.18596 0.85292 4.7335 1 
BB 0.47715 1.276 3.2789 1 
B 0.79462 1.2413 2.4483 0.96578 
T = 4 years 
AAA 0.00775 0.028284 0.090768 1 
AA 0.034974 0.11591 0.33622 1 
A 0.034125 0.13371 0.44172 1 
BBB 0.066538 0.23837 0.74585 1 
BB 0.22582 0.51729 1.205 1 
B 0.47133 0.83094 2.1533 1 
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Table 4 – Statistics for the variables estimated using the Merton model (1974), implied in the 
empirical credit spreads, at the levels of leverage and probability of default. Variables 
(Unknown and Asset, derived from the unknown) estimated through an iterative strategy. 
Variables: (!"!) face value of the debt, (!!) equity market risk premium, (!!) asset volatility, 
(!!) asset dividend yield, (!!) asset return or cost of capital for the firm, (!!) asset risk 
premium, ("!) payout. Other underlying hypotheses for the empirical test: a market volatility !!!) equal to 20% and estimated through the S&P 500 index in the period 1997-2007; risk 
free rate !!!) equal to 8%, as in Huang et al. (2012). 
Estimates of the Fundamentals (part 1) 
 Unknown  Asset 
 !"! !! !! !!  !! !! "! 
T = 10 years 
AAA 31.003 0.097265 0.26231 0.089301  0.20757 0.038266 0.43023 
AA 51.628 0.11136 0.21074 0.085962  0.19734 0.031379 0.4356 
A 80.488 0.12134 0.16516 0.075608  0.1802 0.024593 0.41958 
BBB 116.94 0.12337 0.13698 0.065518  0.1645 0.018978 0.3983 
BB 164.06 0.092706 0.15069 0.049945  0.14985 0.019903 0.33331 
B 230.34 0.078931 0.14289 0.036082  0.13639 0.020311 0.26455 
T = 4 years 
AAA 18.414 0.20589 0.29457 0.26907  0.38325 0.034175 0.70208 
AA 29.936 0.16612 0.26681 0.18951  0.30161 0.0321 0.62833 
A 45.765 0.18425 0.20715 0.16547  0.27083 0.025362 0.61097 
BBB 63.491 0.17718 0.17715 0.136  0.23693 0.02093 0.57402 
BB 83.784 0.13775 0.18539 0.1076  0.20769 0.02009 0.51807 
B 109.19 0.1123 0.17172 0.077158  0.17642 0.019262 0.43735 
         
 
Moreover, this result is entirely consistent with the Contingent 
Claim Analysis (CCA): value rises in a situation of uncertainty. An 
investment in a risk-free security does not generate wealth but 
merely compensates the inflation effect. Thus, trustworthy 
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companies (AAA or lower leverage) should reflect high levels of 
uncertainty concerning asset value and therefore have a higher 
earnings capacity.4 
 
Figure 2 – Skew effect (mean trend) of asset volatility and dividend yield implied by credit 
spreads (10-year maturity). These variables have been estimated using Merton’s (1974) model 
and an iterative strategy (Newton-Raphson). Data source: Huang et al. (2012). 
 
 
However, the estimation, or the dynamics of WDP, should be 
weighted for skew effects deriving from leverage. It is also possible 
to assume that this effect stays positive even in more evolved 
frameworks of analysis, as per the behaviors of the volatility skew. 
As an example, Huang et al. (2012) and others propose an empirical 
comparison whose calibration estimates maintain the skew effect in 
each model under analysis. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Another important (and counterintuitive) implication of this view concerning 
uncertainty is that the asset volatility of a defaulting firm tends to zero. 
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Given the results expressed in Tables 3 and 4, it is possible to 
state that constant WDP per each rating class generates an 
under/over evaluation of the spread. Therefore asset dividend policy 
is a relevant factor when explaining the average differentials in 
companies’ credit spreads. As a result, Hypothesis 1 cannot be 
rejected, and Hypothesis 2 partly at the moment: undervaluation of 
spreads with a constant WDP is greater for investment grade rating 
classes (AAA-BBB), while on the contrary the model generates 
overvaluation for non-investment grade rating classes (BB-B). 
In addition, assuming a variable WDP for different rating classes 
(as per the last test in Table 3), the estimated dividend yield of the 
assets decreases moving from the AAA category towards B, 
highlighting the fact that the WDP has a more significant role in 
explaining spreads relative to the investment grade class. Thus, the 
Credit Spread Puzzle phenomenon seems to originate in an 
erroneous weighting (or mispricing) of effects deriving from 
corporate wealth distribution policies (i.e. investment grade classes 
register higher payouts). This latter consideration is also in line with 
the Dividend Aristocrats phenomenon: companies with a higher 
volatility and rating may be better able to distribute dividends to (or 
to carry out buy-back plans) shareholders. Therefore, the DA is not 
to be considered as an anomaly but, on the contrary, as support for 
the fact that empirical evidence can be used as a proof of a Pecking 
Order Theory (POT) hypothesis. More specifically, wealthy 
corporations (i,e. those distributing high dividends or carrying out 
large buy-back plans and having low issues of shares) underline their 
capability to finance themselves without resorting to debt. To cite 
but a few, Microsoft and Cisco are usually taken as examples of 
companies who barely issue bonds or shares in order to finance their 
R&D projects, thanks to their significant cash flows, sufficiently 
high to reward their investors and guarantee investments and capital 
reserves against distress or default costs. 
Table 4 shows results from other estimates, divided into two main 
groups: in the first are listed estimates of unknown variables, whilst 
the second gives the estimates of the assets’ fundamentals. In the 
former, the estimate of the risk premium (implied by the real data) 
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behaves as variable according to the rating class, confirming the 
aforementioned assumptions (different investors might have different 
perspectives concerning market conditions). In any case, the 
estimates for the risk premium always fall within a limited range: 
approximately 5% for T = 10 years and 9% for 4 years. It is 
interesting to note a difference in the trends revealed by the premium 
for the two maturities reported: for 10 years a concave line is 
obtained, whilst for 4 the skew effect can be seen. With regard to 
debt, face value is directly proportional to credit risk, as in the real 
world. 
The returns on the company’s assets, the asset risk premium and 
the pay-out highlight the skew effect as the asset dividend yield. On 
the contrary, asset volatility shows a (quasi) smile effect. 
 
4.3. Corporate Claims: Risk, Return and Capital Structure 
 
The analyses performed are structured according to the rating 
classes and as a consequence of the average leverage adopted by the 
companies. In addition, further variables connected to market claims 
(equity and bond) are estimated using the model, with the aim of 
analyzing the specific links between risk and return. The first goal of 
this section is to extrapolate specific considerations in terms of 
corporate financing structure, highlighting the risk-return trends 
associated to the rating. Subsequently, this section provides an 
analysis of returns on stock, bonds and assets associated with the 
respective levels of volatility, with the aim of extrapolating market 
effects already highlighted in the literature (LVA). 
Table 5 expresses the estimates relative to claim features, equity 
and bond values and their volatilities, returns and, finally, 
shareholders’ dividend yield. The last column shows the asset value, 
including the effect resulting from the WDP estimated through the 
model. 
The trend of debt value, under the initial hypotheses of the 
estimation process, is the same for both maturities (i.e. 10 and 4 
years). Consistently with the financial markets under observation, 
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claims volatilities appear to be directly proportional to credit risk 
ratings or the leverage, as per the shares returns. 
 
Table 5 – Empirical test results. Variables (derived from unknowns) estimated using the 
Merton model (1974): (!) equity value, (!) debt value, (!!) debt volatility, (!!) equity 
volatility, (!!) equity return, (!!) equity dividend yield and (!!!!!) shows the asset value that 
includes the effect resulting from the DP estimated using the model. Other underlying 
hypotheses for the empirical test: a market volatility !!!) equal to 20% and estimated using 
the S&P 500 index in the period 1997-2007; risk free rate !!!) equal to 8%, as in Huang et al. 
(2012). 
Estimates of the Fundamentals (part 2) 
 ! ! !! !! !! !! !!!!! 
T = 10 years 
AAA 27.862 13.08 0.035491 0.36879 0.1338 0.10274 40.942 
AA 21.152 21.18 0.045605 0.3761 0.136 0.10906 42.332 
A 14.97 31.98 0.054163 0.40227 0.1399 0.11116 46.95 
BBB 8.6548 43.28 0.069827 0.47276 0.1455 0.11551 51.935 
BB 7.1562 53.53 0.096944 0.5527 0.153 0.10748 60.686 
B 3.9755 65.7 0.1124 0.64715 0.17199 0.10274 69.71 
T = 4 years 
AAA 21.006 13.08 0.022914 0.46372 0.1338 0.30956 34.086 
AA 25.679 21.18 0.025964 0.46546 0.136 0.24043 46.859 
A 19.608 31.98 0.034177 0.48925 0.1399 0.24326 51.588 
BBB 14.761 43.28 0.048489 0.55439 0.1455 0.23978 58.041 
BB 11.496 53.53 0.080534 0.67364 0.153 0.23154 65.026 
B 7.7451 65.7 0.099901 0.78094 0.1676 0.22495 73.445 
        
 
The equity dividend yield does not behave in the same way as the 
asset dividend yield. It shows that, first of all, the average 
remuneration (implied in the spreads) in terms of dividends is 
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relevant for each rating class. In fact, the wealth generated by the 
dividends plays an important role compared to the overall wealth. 
However, it is important to remember that in this work the asset 
dividend yield is considered as an index of the expected total 
remuneration (dividends and buy-back). In addition, the BBB rating 
class shows a maximum point, suggesting that shareholders tend to 
increase firm leverage in order to increase wealth distribution. 
In the long term view (10 years), the results seem to confirm the 
predictions of the Trade-off Theory, and the WDP and LP are 
balanced to maximize the DY (implied or expected) in function of 
(or constrained by) the credit rating. Is this extra reward implied in 
CSs due to tax advantages? Probably yes – junk bonds (BB-B) do 
not exhibit this pattern (probably due to increasing default costs). 
In the short term (4 years), the evidence is in favor of the Pecking Order 
Theory: low leverage firms (investment grade) show significant levels of 
payout and DY, but high leverage firms (junk bonds) show an even lower 
level of payout (probably due to increased debt service). 
In order to confirm the long term results, Figure 3 shows the same 
information, with particular reference to the risk-return for assets, 
equity and bonds. Whilst for the companies’ assets and equity, the 
return is compared to its volatility (standard deviation), for the debt 
the combination is expressed by the standard deviation and the 
average yield (credit spread plus risk free rate) of the bond. Each 
relationship is expressed with different markers and refers to the 
trend in accordance with the different rating class or average 
leverage associated with it. For this reason, it is possible to obtain the 
effects in terms of risk-return derived from the average leverage of 
the companies. If we imagine a company with 13% debt and AAA 
rating, shareholders can improve the efficiency of the assets’ risk-
return ratio by increasing the leverage (to 43%) and so decreasing 
the creditworthiness (to a BBB rating). At this moment, the risk-
return relationship is closer to the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) straight line or security market line.5 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 In order to identify the market line, two rates have been linked: the risk free rate 
(8%) and the estimated return of the market portfolio. The latter is found by 
estimating the rating class B. However, the results and conclusions are not 
influenced by this decision. 
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Figure 3 –Risk-return ratio for asset value (A), equity (E) and debt (B), over the security 
market line of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), with specific markers and for each 
rating class (10-year maturity). Data source: Huang et al. (2012). 
 
 
For BB and B classes, which are below investment grade, the 
relationship tends to drift away from the market line, behaving less 
efficiently if compared to higher ratings. In this view, these results 
seem to confirm the Trade-off theory: by increasing debt, 
shareholders could improve the company’s wealth distribution as a 
consequence of higher fiscal benefits. 
Tables 6 and 7 express the analysis of systematic risk (beta), 
correlations with the market, and returns on claims and assets with 
regard to the estimated volatilities. As for equity and bonds, beta is 
estimated by building a relationship between the risk premium of the 
claims (sample data) and the estimated risk premium of the market 
portfolio, so for the asset beta. In turn, the correlations are estimated 
using the beta previously calculated and the relative volatilities of the 
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claims, the assets and the return on the market portfolio. The relative 
formulas used are given in the Appendix.  
 
Table 6 – Estimates relative to the systematic risk (beta) and correlations of claims, equity (E) 
and bonds (B), and of assets (A), per different rating class and maturity. The beta is calculated 
as the ratio between the claim (or asset) risk premium and that relative to the market portfolio 
return. The correlation is derived from the estimates of beta and the volatilities of the claim (or 
assets) and the market portfolio. Data source: Huang et al. (2012). 
Implied Beta and Correlation 
  beta  correlation 
  E B A  E B A 
Maturity: 10 years 
AAA  0.9954 0.0401 0.8112  0.5398 0.2257 0.6185 
AA  0.9632 0.0531 0.6848  0.5122 0.2329 0.6499 
A  0.9433 0.0678 0.5526  0.4690 0.2505 0.6691 
BBB  0.9871 0.1058 0.4608  0.4176 0.3030 0.6728 
BB  1.1819 0.2096 0.4574  0.4277 0.4323 0.6071 
B  1.4016 0.3383 0.4059  0.4332 0.6020 0.5681 
Maturity: 4 years 
AAA  1.3666 0.0207 1.1405  0.5894 0.1805 0.7744 
AA  1.3109 0.0287 0.9801  0.5633 0.2214 0.7346 
A  1.2412 0.0393 0.7813  0.5074 0.2300 0.7543 
BBB  1.2871 0.0666 0.6616  0.4643 0.2748 0.7470 
BB  1.5400 0.1618 0.6457  0.4572 0.4019 0.6966 
B  1.8140 0.2728 0.5596  0.4646 0.5461 0.6518 
 
The estimates (both long and middle term) reported in Table 6 
show a growing increase in systematic risk for bonds, a downward 
trend for assets (skew effect) and a convex (smile effect) tendency 
for equity. 
This suggests that owners of an enterprise with an AAA credit 
rating may be tempted to increase leverage to achieve less exposure 
to systematic risk (at a rating of A). This finding is in contrast with 
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the classical theory (additional borrowing increases equity beta), but 
is consistent with the LVA (in terms of leverage, low-risk firms 
reveal lower levels of volatility, or systematic risk, than other 
categories of companies or shares). The argument is slightly different 
for correlations: if for claims (equity and debt) the trends are similar 
to those seen in relation to systematic risk, as regards firm assets, 
they sometimes suggest a tendency to alternate (long-term) or 
decrease (middle term); however, for both maturities, asset 
correlation appears compressed in a narrow range, respectively 0.67-
0.58 and 0.77-0.65. Another interesting feature is that medium-term 
exposure to systematic risk, and correlation with the market, both 
appear greater than long term exposure. 
Finally, in Table 7 some indices of performance are given in 
order to throw more light on the LVA. The Appendix provides the 
relevant formulae used for calculations. Lambda is the market price 
per unit of associated risk; consistently with the model and the 
theory; it can be seen how this value is independent of relative 
claims analyzed (all are exposed to the same level of uncertainty); 
the peak is reached in relation to a systematic risk exposure rating of 
A or lower on the part of the shareholders. This suggests that equity 
holders could be willing to borrow money in order to achieve greater 
efficiency in terms of the risk premium. 
The Sharpe ratio shows how shareholders achieve a higher risk-
return performance with a low level of debt, while for assets the peak 
is reached at the BBB-rating (long-term) and AAA (middle term); 
for bonds the lower rating category (B) is the most efficient (for both 
maturities). 
In a slightly different way the Treynor index partially expresses 
the same lambda results; indeed, the same results, regardless of the 
claims analyzed, are due to the contingent claim model used, exactly 
as observed previously. However, in this case it is possible to find a 
preference for BBB (long-term) and AAA (middle term) ratings; in 
any case, both are included in the investment grade category, 
because the low-risk firms in terms of leverage show increased 
efficiency compared to companies which are more exposed to debt 
(or beta). The last two indices (TR/sd and TR/beta) reinforce the 
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results already presented and show consistency with the LVA. For 
all claims (and for the assets of the company) and for both 
maturities, higher efficiency is obtained with a low level of leverage 
and risk exposure, suggesting that investors prefer to select low-risk 
(or reliable in terms of rating) companies. 
 
Table 7 – Estimates relative to some performance indices: premium per unit of risk or price of 
risk (lambda), Sharpe ratio, Treynor ratio, Total Return on standard deviation and Total Return 
on beta. Data source: Huang et al. (2012). 
Performance Indexes 
                
T = 10 years lambda Sharpe Treynor TR/sd TR/beta 
 E B A E B A E B A E B A E B A 
AAA 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.42 0.18 0.49 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.64 2.43 0.79 0.24 2.15 0.26 
AA 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.44 0.20 0.56 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.65 1.95 0.94 0.25 1.68 0.29 
A 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.43 0.23 0.61 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.62 1.70 1.09 0.27 1.36 0.33 
BBB 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.38 0.28 0.62 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.55 1.42 1.20 0.26 0.94 0.36 
BB 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.33 0.33 0.46 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.47 1.16 0.99 0.22 0.53 0.33 
B 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.30 0.42 0.39 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.42 1.13 0.95 0.20 0.38 0.34 
                
T = 4 years lambda  Sharpe Treynor TR/sd TR/beta 
 E B A E B A E B  E B  E B A 
AAA 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.78 0.24 1.03 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.96 3.73 1.30 0.32 4.13 0.34 
AA 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.64 0.25 0.83 0.23 0.23 0.83 0.81 3.33 1.13 0.29 3.01 0.31 
A 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.62 0.28 0.92 0.24 0.24 0.92 0.78 2.62 1.31 0.31 2.28 0.35 
BBB 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.55 0.33 0.89 0.24 0.24 0.89 0.69 1.98 1.34 0.30 1.44 0.36 
BB 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.45 0.40 0.69 0.20 0.20 0.69 0.57 1.39 1.12 0.25 0.69 0.32 
B 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.40 0.47 0.56 0.17 0.17 0.56 0.50 1.27 1.03 0.22 0.47 0.32 
 
The big difference that distinguishes the different categories of 
creditworthiness lies in the relationship between leverage policies 
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(LP) and those relating to the distribution of wealth (WDP). 
Companies rated best show better performance, thus permitting 
greater wealth distribution to their investors. Thus it could be said 
that the LVA effect is influenced by this relationship, or rather by the 
links between the two policies and business risk. 
In conclusion, it should be noted that both the LVA and the CSP 
are determined by the WDP and the LP (at least in the model 
adopted and the results obtained). However, results are strongly 
dependent upon the choices inherent in the adopted model and the 
underlying hypotheses related to calibration. In the former case, a 
significant limit is represented by the equity value function of the 
model, in that greater wealth distribution penalizes the equity value 
if compared to total assets; the dividend flow is not perfectly 
captured in shareholder pay-offs by Merton’s model, leaving the 
reader to imagine that other models could estimate it better. In the 
latter case, the calibration process reflects subjective choices 
regarding the return, market risk and other factors; however, if these 
are estimated in any other way, they should not create distortions in 
the model presented. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The paper highlights the importance of a firm’s wealth 
distribution policy when explaining its credit spreads and dividend 
yield. Even though it is possible to find preceding contributions, in 
particular with regard to the relevance assumed by a more adequate 
estimation of the dividend level when computing theoretical credit 
spreads (so as to be in line with empirical data), there is a lack within 
the existing literature of work on behaviors or trends resulting from 
different wealth distribution policies according to different levels of 
leverage (or rating). This paper aims to show the existence of a 
specific pattern, implied in the empirical credit spreads, which is 
very similar to (conditioned by) the implied asset volatility effect. As 
the latter phenomenon persists in more evolved structural models, it 
is possible that the asset dividend yield skew effect will behave in 
exactly the same way. 
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Results play a paramount role both in terms of modeling and 
empirical investigation: when defining efficient models and, more 
importantly, when calibrating, it is necessary to include this aspect. 
The results classify investment grade companies as the most 
remunerative in terms of firm wealth distribution, suggesting that the 
Credit Spread Puzzle phenomenon (that is, the inability of the 
structural model, among others, to explain real credit spreads) is due 
to an erroneous computation or model calibration of the effects 
deriving from different asset dividend policies. This effect appears to 
be greater for firms in top rating classes. Moreover, our results show 
that these companies also register higher asset volatility than their 
non-investment grade counterparts, highlighting links with those 
securities known as Dividend Aristocrats, i.e. those with the highest 
dividend yields. 
On the one hand, our tests seem to support the Pecking Order 
Theory, especially in the short term: wealthy firms (with low 
leverage or/and AAA rating) are able to generate high cash levels to 
be redistributed to shareholders. This allows them to finance 
themselves and their projects without increasing their leverage. 
Unsurprisingly, these companies behave as the best-in-class. 
On the other hand, considering the long term results within the 
same category of investment grade class, BBB-companies seem to 
obtain benefits (or tax shields) in terms of the efficiency of the 
assets’ risk-return relationship, reflected in a higher equity dividend 
yield. This supports the Trade-off Theory, at least partially.  
Despite adherence to the two main theories in terms of Capital 
Structure, it is interesting to note that results are not contradictory, 
rather highlighting specific average behaviors in a migration phase 
across rating classes. To conclude, companies can perceive and 
transfer (to the shareholders) positive fiscal benefits only in the long 
term. In the short term, firms prefer low leverage because the present 
value of expected default costs can be higher than tax advantages. 
This result leads to the conclusion that a similar calibration, both in 
terms of business risk (volatility skew) and firm wealth distribution 
(dividend yield skew) should, with other structural approaches, make 
it possible to integrate the underlying hypotheses of both main 
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theories concerning capital structure within more evolved 
frameworks. 
Furthermore, the results are consistent with the low volatility 
anomaly which has emerged in the literature: low-risk firms reveal a 
better performance per unit of risk with respect to the high-risk 
companies. This finding suggests a link between the low volatility 
anomaly and the credit spread puzzle: in both cases, the wealth 
distribution policy adopted (and business risk) plays a crucial role in 
classifying the firms. 
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Appendix 
 
The goal of this section is to present a shortened version of the 
adapted model in order to highlight the equations deployed in the 
estimation of the parameters, following a replication principle. 
The intuition underlying the model proposed by Merton (1974) is to 
imagine the market equity value of a company (E) as a call option 
written on the value of the underlying asset: 
 !! ! "!# !! ! !! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"! 
 
or 
 !! ! ! !!!!!!!!! !! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!! !! ! !!!!!!! !! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"! 
  
where (A) is the asset value of the company, (yA) is the asset dividend 
yield, (D) is the face value of the debt and N(...) is the cumulative 
standard normal distribution. Notoriously, N(d1) and N(d2) are, 
respectively, the probability that the value of the assets to maturity of 
the debt is higher than the value of the liabilities and the probability 
that the debt is repaid. In this context, N(-d2) represents the 
probability of failure of the issuer: 
 
 ! !!! ! ! ! !" !! ! !!!!!!!!!! !!! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"! 
  
also defined as the risk-neutral default probability. 
According to Huang and Huang (2012), the physical (real) 
probability of default can be calculated by defining the expected 
return on assets and cost of capital (rA - cost of capital for the 
company or the investment’s rate), the time horizon T (equal to one) 
and the value of the liabilities that represents the default barrier 
threshold. So: 
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 ! !!! ! ! ! !" !! ! !!!!!!!!!! !!! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"! 
 
This is the third equation reported in the first (1) and in the second 
(2) system, in section 3.3. 
The function of the corporate bonds used to derive the leverage (!!! ) 
is defined in Merton (1974) as: 
 !! ! !"!!!!! !! ! !!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
Finally, the credit spread of the corporate bond is equal to: 
 !"! ! ! !" !!!! ! !! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
By Ito's lemma and assuming that asset volatility is represented only 
by systematic risk, as explained in Hsia (1981), we can define the 
expected return on equity (kE) and the volatility of both claims in a 
framework based jointly on the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the 
Contingent Claim Analysis: 
 !! ! !! ! "!!!!! !!!! !! ! !! ! !! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !! ! ! !! !!!!!!!!! !! ! !! ! !! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
 !! ! "!!!!! !!!! !! ! ! !! !!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 !! ! "!!!!! !!!! !! ! ! !!! !!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
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From CAPM, we can calculate the beta of a generic i-security: 
 !! ! !! "!!! ! !! !! ! !! ! !! !!! ! !! ! !! "!!!!! ! !! ! !!!!!!!"!!!
 
where (MD/E) points out market data and (E) estimated. Thus the 
correlation is!
 !! ! !! !!"!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
 
Performance Indices: (!!) is the total return, (!!) the dividend yield or 
rate, (!!) the volatility of the return and (!!) is the usual risk free rate. 
The difference between (!!) and (!!) defines the return (!!) related to 
the capital gain due to the investments of the firm, or alternatively it 
could indicate the investment rate needed to compete in the market 
or sector. We define: 
 
Lambda (price of risk) 
 !! ! !! ! !! ! !!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!
 
 
Sharpe Ratio 
 !! ! !! ! !!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!
 
 
Treynor Ratio 
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!! ! !! ! !!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!
 
 
(Total Return)/(standard deviation) 
 "!!!"!! ! !!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!
 
 
(Total Return)/(beta) 
 "!!!!! ! !!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!
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